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GIDEON'S TRUMPET BLOWS FOR
MISDEMEANANTS-ARGERSINGER
v. HAMLIN, THE DECISION
AND ITS IMPACT
Sheldon Portman*
INTRODUCTION
On June 12, 1972, forty years after Due Process status
was conferred upon the right to counsel' and nearly ten years
after its mandatory application in all state felony prosecutions,2
the Supreme Court in Argersinger v. Hamlin' further extended
the requirement of counsel to all cases in which imprisonment
is imposed regardless of the classification of the offense. In
Gideon v. Wainwright the Court had rejected a previously im-
posed limitation4 that required "an appraisal of the totality of
facts in a given case" as a condition to the requirement of provid-
ing counsel in state cases.' Although Gideon was interpreted as
probably limiting the right to appointment of counsel "in felony
cases" only,8 neither the language nor the reasoning of that deci-
sion expressed such a limitation.' In fact, Mr. Justice Black's
majority opinion left little doubt that ultimately the Court would
conclude that the right to counsel applied across the board:
[R]eason and reflection require us to recognize that in our
adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
* B.A., Kent State University, 1952; LL.B., (Case) Western Reserve Uni-
versity School of Law, 1954; Member of Ohio Bar and California Bar; admitted
to practice before the Supreme Court of the United States; Public Defender,
Santa Clara County, California; Director, National Legal Aid and Defender
Association and Western Regional Defender Association; Past-President, Cali-
fornia Public Defenders Association.
1. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
2. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
3. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
4. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
5. Id. at 462.
6. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). See also In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 29 (1967).
7. On a number of occasions prior to Argersinger, the Court did, however,
deny certiorari in state cases wherein counsel had been denied in misdemeanor
prosecutions. Winters v. Beck, 365 U.S. 907 (1966); Deloseph v. Conn., 385
U.S. 982 (1966).
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court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured
a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him.8
At the time of Argersinger, most states had already recognized
the right to counsel in misdemeanor cases. 9 Thirty-six states re-
quired counsel, including twenty-two which accorded the right
even when the possible penalty was less than six months impris-
onment. Only twelve states did not recognize any right to counsel
at all in misdemeanor cases. 10
Despite the "handwriting on the wall," the Argersinger decision
presented troublesome problems for at least two members of the
Court, who voiced grave reservations about the heavy impact the
decision was bound to have upon the states.
This article will endeavor to present an in-depth analysis of
this important decision, as well as the practical problems it pre-
sents and the available solutions to those problems. The poten-
tial benefits of the decision will also be considered.
I. THE DECISION ITSELF
A. The Legal Issues
On January 13, 1970, Jon Richard Argersinger pleaded
guilty to the Florida misdemeanor offense of carrying a con-
cealed weapon. He was indigent and was not represented by
counsel. After receiving a sentence of three months in the county
jail, he had obtained the assistance of counsel and petitioned for
habeas corpus in the Supreme Court of Florida. He claimed
that he had been unrepresented by counsel due to indigence, that
he had not waived the assistance of counsel, and that he had had
a defense to the charges which he, as an indigent layman, had
been unable to properly raise and present.
The Florida Supreme Court dismissed Argersinger's applica-
tion for a writ, holding that an indigent defendant accused of a
misdemeanor is entitled to court-appointed counsel only if the
offense carries a possible penalty of more than six months impris-
onment. This conclusion was based upon the reasoning in Dun-
can v. Louisiana," wherein the Supreme Court had limited the
8. 372 U.S. at 344 (emphasis added).
9. Brief of the Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n as Amicus Curiae at
41, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). In Appendix A of the NLADA
brief, a survey was presented entitled, Law and Practice in Fifty States Re-
garding the Right to Appointed Counsel.
10. The following states were listed as not recognizing any right to counsel
in misdemeanor cases: Alaska, Arkansas, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Ohio, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Virginia and Washington.
11. 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968), cited in, State ex rel. Argersinger, 236 So.2d
442 (1970).
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right to trial by jury to non-petty offenses, i.e., offenses carry-
ing a penalty of more than six months imprisonment.
The first issue in Argersinger was whether the Florida Supreme
Court had correctly applied Duncan in restricting the requirement
of providing counsel. The Court, pointing out that the origins of
the right to counsel and to jury trial were quite dissimilar, was
unanimous in rejecting that analogy. Unlike the right to jury trial,
which was recognized at common law, there was no such right to
counsel in felony cases. However, in misdemeanor cases, the
right to counsel was allowed."2 In addition, as noted by Mr. Justice
Powell, who authored the minority concurring opinion, the two
rights were distinguished on the basis that trial by jury was "not as
fundamental to the guarantee of a fair trial as the right to coun-
sel.' 3 Furthermore, he noted that, unlike Gideon which had been
given retroactive effect,' 4 the sixth amendment right to jury trial
had been restricted to prospective application only.' 5
Mr. Justice Douglas, author of the majority opinion, stress-
ed the essential relationship of the right to counsel to the require-
ment of a fair trial. In this regard, he quoted from Mr. Justice
Sutherland's classic opinion in Powell v. Alabama,'6 on the need
for "the guiding hand of counsel" in order to avoid being "put
on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon incompetent
evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise in-
admissible . . . [and in order to] prepare his defense .... ,17
To this he added Mr. Justice Black's famous language from Gid-
eon v. Wainwright:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some coun-
tries, but it is in ours. From the very beginning, our state
and national constitutions and laws have laid great empha-
sis on procedural and substantive safeguards designed to
assure fair trials before impartial tribunals in which every
defendant stands equal before the law. This noble ideal
cannot be realized if the poor man charged with crime has
to face his accusers without a lawyer to assist him.18
The Court also equated the right to counsel with those rights
considered "basic in our system of jurisprudence" such as the
right to reasonable notice of the charge, the opportunity to be
12. 407 U.S. at 27-28, 46.
13. Id. at 46.
14. Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 2 (1963).
15. DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968).
16. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
17. 407 U.S. at 31, quoting 287 U.S. at 68-69.
18. Id. at 32, quoting 372 U.S. at 344.
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heard, and the right to examine witnesses and to offer testimony
in one's own behalf.' 9
Referring to a number of important constitutional cases aris-
ing from misdemeanor prosecutions,20 the Court further observed
that it was not convinced that legal and constitutional issues were
any less complex in a case where a conviction evoked a lesser
penalty. In this connection, reference was made to In re Gault,2
which imposed the right to counsel in juvenile delinquency pro-
ceedings. In Gault the underlying offense had been a misde-
meanor, which if prosecuted in an adult case, would have drawn
no more than two months in jail. Nevertheless, the Court con-
cluded that a child required the "guiding hand of counsel" in
order "to cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into
the facts, to insist upon regularity of the proceedings, and to as-
certain whether he has a defense and to prepare and submit it."'z2
Beyond the importance of counsel to insure a fair trial, the
Court also recognized the need for legal assistance for the pur-
pose of a guilty plea, observing that:
Counsel is needed so that the accused may know precisely
what he is doing, so that he is fully aware of the prospect
of going to jail or prison, and so that he is treated fairly
by the prosecution.23
In regard to such pleas, the majority was especially concerned
about the pressures of the heavy volume of misdemeanor prosecu-
tions and the resultant "obsession for speedy dispositions, regard-
less of the fairness of the result."24  Gross examples of high-vol-
ume, inadequate court staffing, and "assembly-line justice," were
cited from the Report of the President's Commission on Law
Enforcement and Administration of Justice.2 5  Quoting Dean Ed-
ward Barrett from the Crime Commission Report, the Court
acknowledged the detrimental impact of these conditions upon
the individual defendant:
19. Id. at 33, citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
20. Id. at 33, citing Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (Issue of viola-
tion of the eighth amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment by prosecu-
tion of a chronic alcoholic); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960)
(conviction for loitering or disorderly conduct without substantive evidence of
the crime as violation of due process); Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87
(1965) (City ordinance forbidding loitering or standing on a sidewalk after
having been asked to move by a police officer held overbroad and in violation of
due process); Papachristou v. Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (Declaring
vagrancy statute which made it illegal to be an habitual loafer, among other
things, a violation of the Due Process Clause for being overbroad).
21. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
22. 407 U.S. at 33, quoting 387 U.S. at 36-37.
23. 407 U.S. at 34.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 34-35, quoting REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw
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Suddenly it becomes clear that for most defendants in the
criminal process, there is scant regard for them as individ-
uals. They are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be
processed and sent on their way. The gap between theory
and reality is enormous. 26
Although the Court was unanimous on the importance of
counsel to insure a fair trial, the minority opinion diverged on
the question of when the right to counsel is constitutionally com-
pelled. 27 The majority concluded that, regardless of the classifi-
cation of the offense, imprisonment could not constitutionally
occur without representation by counsel or an intelligent waiver
thereof.
Mr. Justice Douglas viewed this decision as forewarning a
judge that he would be unable to imprison an accused, regard-
less of local law, unless counsel were provided. Accordingly,
the judge would have to measure "the seriousness and gravity
of the offense" in advance of trial in order to determine whether
to appoint an attorney to represent the accused.2"
In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger further ex-
plained that the trial judge and the prosecutor would need to
"engage in a predictive evaluation of each case to determine
whether there [was] a significant likelihood that, if the defendant
[were] convicted, the trial judge [would] sentence him to a jail
term.
,2 9
The minority concurrence by Mr. Justice Powell, joined in
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY 128 (1967) [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME
IN A FREE SOCIETY].
26. Id. at 35.
27. Although reversal of Argersinger's conviction was unanimous the opinion
of the Court was supplemented by three concurring opinions: one by Justice
Brennan joined by Justices Douglas and Stewart; one by Chief Justice Burger;
and a third by Justice Powell joined by Justice Rehnquist.
28. 407 U.S. at 40. A recent survey of municipal court judges in Cuyahoga
County, Ohio, reports scepticism regarding the ability of a trial judge to make
such a decision without a full determination of the merits of a case. The judges
surveyed were also concerned that a determination of any depth "would com-
promise the judge's ability to be an unbiased trier of fact." Katz, A Report to
the Court Management Project on Right to Counsel in Misdemeanor Cases in
Cuyahoga County 5-6 (1972).
Professor Lewis Katz, the author of the Cuyahoga County report, also
criticized the Supreme Court for failing to provide "meaningful guidance" on
how to decide this question and for the majority's apparent disregard of the
problems of the lower courts in attempting such decisions. Id. at 4. However,
in defense of the Court, this may well have been a purposeful imposition de-
signed to bring about a breakdown, and thereby, a reform of the "assembly-line"
justice which is so characteristic of most urban courts. That process was itself
cited as one of the principle reasons for requiring the presence of counsel. See
text accompanying note 25 supra.
29. 407 U.S. at 42.
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by Mr. Justice Rehnquist, viewed both the majority's rule and
that of the Florida Supreme Court as too rigid. They preferred
a "middle course between the extremes," namely that of "the
principle of due process that requires fundamental fairness in
criminal trials . . . encompass[ing] the right to counsel in petty
cases whenever the assistance of counsel is necessary to insure a
fair trial. 30
The minority did agree, however, that misdemeanor prosecu-
tions were no less complex than felonies, and that even in minor
cases, ignorance or other handicaps could make the layman in-
capable of representing himself.31 In addition to these consider-
ations, the minority opinion expounded at length on the collateral
consequences of petty offense convictions. Among these conse-
quences were noted the "deplorable conditions in local jails"
to which misdemeanants were often subjected, the detrimental
effect of a criminal record on employability, the stigma of con-
victions for offenses such as drunk driving or hit and run, and
the impact upon employment resulting from the loss of one's driv-
er's license upon conviction of certain traffic offenses. Accord-
ingly, it was concluded that, even beyond imprisonment, the
"deprivation of property rights and interests" could render a de-
nial of assistance of counsel contrary to due process. 2
This concern for the collateral consequences of a petty of-
fense conviction was the syllogistic springboard for attacking what
Mr. Justice Powell described as a "mechanistic application" by
the Court of an "inflexible rule . . . regardless of circum-
stances." 3  Then, in a sudden leap of logic, the minority ac-
cused the Court of extending the right to counsel to indigents
where it would rarely be exercised by others, thus favoring in-
digents over other low income groups and further accentuating
the advantage of being barely self-sufficient economically. 4 This
30. Id. at 47.
31. Id. at 47-48.
32. Id. at 48. Mr. Justice Douglas brushed aside this point by observing
that the application of the sixth amendment to cases not involving loss of
liberty need not be considered because the petitioner had in fact been sentenced
to jail. Id. at 37.
33. Id. at 49.
34. Id. at 49-50. This conclusion is clearly inaccurate if the majority's rule
is literally restricted to the consequence of imprisonment. If so, it would cer-
tainly be a rare case in which a non-indigent defendant, confronted with the
"practical possibility" of imprisonment, would not secure the services of counsel.
Even in cases of aggravating collateral consequences, such as loss of employment,
it is doubtful whether an informed non-indigent person, having an intelligent
and understanding knowledge of such consequences, would not obtain counsel.
The fact is that in many lower courts, operating under assembly-line conditions,
such consequences are rarely explained, and defendants often plead guilty with-
out counsel, ignorant of the ramifications of their plea. Cf. In re Johnson,
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criticism was based on the assumption that the scope of the right
to appointed counsel under the majority view extended to collat-
eral consequences beyond imprisonment.
Recognizing the gap in logic, the minority doubled back
to explain its underlying assumption that the Court's rule would
supply counsel in all cases and not merely those involving im-
prisonment. Conceding that the Court had not gone "all the
way," the minority nevertheless contended that that was "the
thrust" of the new rule.3 5 This assessment was based upon still
another assumption, namely that, since the majority opinion had
rejected the exercise of judicial discretion regarding the need for
counsel if a jail sentence was to be imposed, it could be assumed
that discretion would be similarly dispensed with in other petty
cases wherein there might be more serious consequences than brief
incarceration. 6 Accordingly, it was predicted that the require-
ment of counsel for imprisonment cases "foreshadow[ed] adop-
tion of a broad prophylactic rule applicable to all petty offenses. '37
The minority also criticized the new rule on the basis that it
would lead to arbitrary judicial classification of imprisonment or
non-imprisonment offenses without regard to legislative
options, thereby deterring personalized decisions regarding guilt
and punishment. In addition, an equal protection issue was
predicted based on the prospect of variances in the assignment of
counsel for offenses with consequences other than imprisonment.
After giving lengthy consideration to a variety of predicted
practical problemss the minority concluded that the right to
counsel in petty theft cases should best be left to a case-by-case
determination. As in the majority view, however, a trial court
still would have to make a decision on whether to assign counsel
prior to accepting a plea in order to provide a defendant with ad-
vice on the necessity of a trial if the evidence of guilt were not
overwhelming.3 9
In order to preserve the question for review, the trial court
62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965). If lower court judges
were required to explain such consequences, it might well result in a sub-
stantial increase of represented defendants, and thus, remove the basis of the
minority's objection on this point.
35. 407 U.S. at 51.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 52.
38. These problems are discussed infra at pp. 8-11.
39. 407 U.S. at 63. This view would have required arraignment judges
to engage in a far more detailed assessment of evidence in advance of trial than
that required under the majority rule. A judge's ability to maintain an unbiased
view without prejudice to a later hearing of the case would have been even more
precarious had the minority's view prevailed. See note 28 and accompanying
text supra.
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would be required to state the reasons for denial of counsel on
the record. Subsequent proceedings and evidence would have to
be "scrutinized" to insure that any later change of plea was sup-
ported by the facts. During trial, the judge would have to inter-
vene on behalf of a defendant if necessary. Similarly, the appel-
late court would be expected to "carefully scrutinize" all decisions
denying counsel.
Under the minority view, three factors would be considered:
1) the complexity of the offense, including whether the state had
counsel; 2) the probable sentence, including other consequences
of a conviction; and 3) the individual factors peculiar to the given
case.40 While recognizing that this was, in effect, the old Betts v.
Brady4 doctrine, which had been rejected in Gideon because
state courts had defaulted in the exercise of their responsibilities,
nevertheless the minority contended that ,a similar default should
not be assumed with regard to petty offenses.42
Finally, while conceding that its view would create problems
for local courts, the minority nevertheless insisted that, by com-
parison, a case-by-case determination would "minimize prob-
lems.,,43
B. The Practical Problems Recognized
The practical problems, both inherent in the issue and as a
consequence of the Court's ruling, were considered by all of the
opinions filed in Argersinger. Such problems included the numbers
of cases affected by the decision, the availability of legal manpower,
the expense to state and local governments, and the inevitable im-
pact on the courts.
1. The Volume of Cases
The majority opinion's chief concern in regard to case vol-
ume was the impact of such volume upon fair trials, creating the
40. Id. at 64.
41. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
42. 407 U.S. at 65.
43. Id. at 66 n.34. This statement reveals the naivete of the minority with
respect to the operations of the lower courts. The requirement that these courts
"scrutinize" cases prior to plea and make the highly refined determinations sug-
gested by the minority opinion would doubtlessly impose an impossible burden
for the many urban courts which conduct hundreds of arraignments each day.
By comparison, assessing the prospect of imprisonment on the basis of the
charge and supporting police report would seem a far less onerous and time-
consuming burden.
The imposition of the minority view upon the appellate process would also
have been considerable. The time expended by appellate judges and law clerks
in reviewing denial of counsel claims in petty offenses would undoubtedly far
outweigh any burden resulting from an across-the-board requirement of counsel
in all imprisonment cases. In almost every case of imprisonment or collateral
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"obsession with speedy dispositions" and the phenomenon of "as-
sembly line justice," thereby necessitating the assistance of coun-
sel.
A secondary problem was that of the difficulty of providing
counsel in so many cases." A partial solution was suggested by
removal of many petty offenses from the court system. Referring
to an American Bar Association report,45 Mr. Justice Douglas ob-
served that victimless crimes, such as drunkenness, narcotics ad-
diction, vagrancy, and deviant sexual behavior could be trans-
ferred to non-judicial entities, e.g., detoxification centers, nar-
cotics treatment centers, and social service agencies. In addition,
it was suggested that other non-serious offenses, like housing code
and traffic violations, could be handled by specialized admini-
strative bodies.46
2. Shortage of Legal Manpower
The adequacy of legal resources to meet the need for counsel
resulting from the Court's decision was also given consideration.
On the basis of an earlier study, the Court concluded that be-
tween 1,575 to 2,300 full-time attorneys would be required to
represent all indigent misdemeanants other than traffic offend-
ers.47  Citing the total number of attorneys in the United States
(335,200),48 projected to double by 1985,19 the Court concluded
that there would be little difficulty meeting the demands for at-
torney manpower resulting from the new decision. But even if
a problem arose in this regard, Mr. Justice Brennan suggested,
in a concurring opinion, that law students in clinical programs
could provide "a significant contribution, quantitatively and
qualitatively, to the representation of the poor. ... 0
But the minority took exception to what it considered to be
a lack of concern by the Court on this question. In addition to
consequences, such as the loss of a driver's license, wherein counsel had not
been supplied by the trial court, there would probably be an appeal, adding
further congestion to an overburdened appellate court system.
44. Id. at 34 n.4. The majority estimated that there were four to five
million misdemeanor cases annually, and between forty and fifty million traffic
offenses.
45. ABA SPECIAL COMM. ON CRIME PREVENTION AND CONTROL, NEW
PERSPECTIVES ON URBAN CRIME (1972).
46. 407 U.S. at 38 n.9.
47. Id. at 37 n.7, citing Note, Dollars and Sense of an Expanded Right to
Counsel, 55 IOWA L. REV. 1249 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Dollars and Sense].
48. Id., citing STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 153 (1971).
49. Id., citing Ruud, That Burgeoning Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A.J.
146, 147 (1972), reporting 18,000 new admissions to the Bar each year-3,500
more than required to fill 14,500 average annual openings.
50. Id. at 41. On the problems associated with the utilization of law stu-
dents, see note 100 infra.
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defense attorneys, Mr. Justice Powell observed that more prosecu-
tors, judges and court reporters would be required. He took is-
sue with the majority's reference to the total number of lawyers
in the United States as potentially available, pointing out that
many of these were in corporate and government work, and that
the ability of the others to function in the area of criminal law
was unknown.
3. The Expense to Local Communities
The primary concern for the minority, however, was the
financial impact of the decision upon state and local governments-
a problem which the majority had virtually ignored, except for
a brief reference by the Chief Justice."
Considerable doubt was expressed by the minority that the
states and local communities would have the resources to supply,
not only the defense lawyers, but the prosecutors, the additional
courts and the court reporters which would be required. Citing
the example of the Town of Wood, South Dakota, which had
been unable to retain counsel to file a pleading with the Court,
the minority was certain that the capabilities of many state courts
and local communities would be seriously overtaxed. It concluded
that many communities like the Town of Wood would no longer
be able to enforce their laws. 52
4. The Impact on Overburdened Courts
The minority opinion also gloomily predicted that the prob-
lems of congestion and delay in the nation's lower courts would
be "exacerbated" by the new rule. Of particular concern in this
regard was the penchant of defense attorneys, especially young
lawyers who would be likely to receive most appointments, to
exhaust every possible legal avenue regardless of the probable
benefit and to stretch out the process in their eagerness to make
a reputation and to acquire court exposure. In support of the
latter statement, Justice Powell cited a survey conducted in Cook
County, Illinois, reporting a comparison of jury trials requested
by appointed private counsel, retained counsel, counsel from a
bar association's committee for the defense of prisoners, and coun-
51. In his concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger observed that, had he
"focusfed] solely" on this problem, he would have been inclined toward the
six months confinement rule of the Florida Supreme Court. 407 U.S. at 41.
52. Id. at 61. The Town of Wood occasionally employed an attorney to rep-
resent it but the office of the nearest attorney was 40 miles away and the town,
with a population of 132, was quite poor. When asked by the Supreme Court
to file a response to a writ of certiorari, the town decided that contesting the
case would be an unwise allocation of its limited resources. Id.
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sel supplied by the public defender's office. 58  The survey showed
that the bar association panel opted for jury trials in 63% of the
cases, whereas retained and appointed counsel and the public de-
fenders requested such trials in 33% and 15%, respectively.54
The minority conceded that its own view of a case-by-case
determination regarding the necessity of counsel would also create
a burden for the lower courts. But without explanation, Justice
Powell asserted that the "careful scrutiny" he would require trial
and appellate courts to exercise in order to determine the need
for counsel in any given case would impose a lesser burden
upon those courts. In sharp contrast, the majority opinion gave
no consideration to the impact of its decision upon the lower
courts. In fact, the impact of "assembly-line operations" in many
lower courts upon the rights of defendants was cited as a primary
justification for requiring the assistance of counsel:
The calendar is long, speed often is substituted for care,
and casually arranged out of court compromise too often is
substituted for adjudication. Inadequate attention tends to
be given to the individual defendant, whether in protecting
his rights, sifting the facts at trial, deciding the social risks
he presents, or determining how to deal with him after con-
viction. The frequent result is futility and failure.55
II. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
The majority and concurring opinions in Argersinger indi-
cate essentially three practical problems which must be overcome
in order to carry out the mandate of this decision. These prob-
lems include the financial burden, the legal manpower require-
ments, and the impact on an overburdened lower court system.
Each of these problems and their potential solutions will now be
considered.
A. The Financial Burden
Estimating the financial cost of the Argersinger decision is
difficult because of the lack of reliable caseload data from which
to make financial projections. In Argersinger, the Court
53. Id. at 59 n.24, citing D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM AND THE INDIGENT 159 (1968).
54. Id. The opinion quotes from a statement in the survey suggesting an
explanation for the lower percentage of jury trials requested by public defenders
as a consciousness "of the probable extra penalty accruing to a defendant who
loses his case before a jury." This seemingly implies minority approval for a
patently unconstitutional pressure reportedly practiced in several urban courts.
See, I Have Nothing to Do with Justice, LIFE, Mar. 12, 1971, at 57; Justice on
Trial, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1971, at 16.
55. 407 U.S. at 35, quoting REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE
SOCIETY, supra note 25.
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referred to an estimated need for 1,575 to 2,300 appointed at-
torneys to service the indigent portion (1.25 million) of between
four and five million misdemeanants annually.5 6 However, those
figures are questionable since they are based on projections from
1962 data of twelve states. 7
In the absence of current data from which to assess Arger-
singer's financial impact, available California statistics should
provide a fairly reliable basis for making such projections. The
state's large population (19,968,004) approximates one-tenth of
the nation's total (203,211,926) and allows for an easy-to-apply
1-to-10 projection ratio. In addition, the variations in the ethnic
and racial makeup, density of California's population, and the
variety of climates and topography in the state, duplicate prac-
tically every demographic and geographic condition found any-
where in the country. It also has the dubious distinction of the
highest total crime index in the United States (4,307.0 per 100,000
population).58
The reliability of projections based on California data is also
enhanced by the reputed accuracy of its crime statistics, which
are gathered by one of the best crime data centers in the coun-
try-the California Bureau of Criminal Statistics. In addition,
California has the oldest and probably most highly developed
county public defender system in the country."9 Furthermore, Cali-
fornia counties have had more than seven years experience provid-
ing compensated counsel to indigent misdemeanants.i 0
56. 407 U.S. at 37 n.7, citing Dollars and Sense; id. at 34 n.4, citing
PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK
FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 55 (1967) [hereinafter cited 'as TASK FORCE RE-
PORT].
57. The TASK FORCE REPORT in turn quoted projections from L. SILVERSTEIN,
DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS 123-24
(1965) [hereinafter cited as DEFENSE OF THE POOR]. The Silverstein estimate
that four to five million court cases annually involve misdemeanors is based on
a 12 state study.
At this writing, a current data base is being gathered by the National Legal
Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), funded by a Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration (LEAA) grant. The National Legal Aid and De-
fender Association is conducting a nation-wide survey of defender services and
will assess the costs of such services to meet the requirements of Argersinger.
58. CALIF. COUNCIL ON CRIM. JUSTICE, 1972 CALIF. COMPREHENSIVE PLAN
FOR CRIM. JUSTICE 52 [hereinafter cited as CCCJ, 1972 PLAN]. This has been
attributed to its young and highly mobile population.
59. Latest published data reports that in 1969-70, 34 of California's 58
counties expended $13.3 million for public defender services. CCCJ, 1972
PLAN A-210. The total staffing of these offices was 998 personnel. Among
this number were 621 full-time and 28 part-time attorneys, and 108 full-time and
3 part-time investigators.
The first public defender office in the country was established in Los
Angeles in 1914. Currently that office includes nearly 400 attorneys.
60. See CAL. PEN. CODE § 987.2 (West Supp. 1973); CAL. GOV'T CODE §
27706(a) (West Supp. 1973).
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The total cost for all indigent defense services provided by
public defenders and other appointed counsel in California during
1969-70 was $18.5 million." By projecting California's cost for
these services on the basis of the ratio of the state's population to
that of the nation (1-to-10), it may be concluded that, had Arger-
singer been in effect during 1969-70, indigent legal services in
all of the states would have required a maximum cost of $185
million. This compares with an actual nation-wide expenditure
during that period of $46.4 million--only about one-fourth of the
California cost projection. 2
If the $138.5 million disparity between the California pro-
jection and the actual expenditure was due to the absence of ser-
vices for misdemeanants, then obviously an increase equal to
that amount would be required to comply with Argersinger.'5
On the other hand, this disparity could be attributed to the gen-
erally low level of funding for defense services in other case cate-
gories as well. In either event, assuming that the California ex-
perience is a reliable basis for projecting the costs of optimum de-
fender services, it may be concluded that a total annual expendi-
ture of $185 million will be required, or four times the amount ac-
tually expended.
Although there is no official breakdown of California costs
by category of cases, misdemeanor cases can be roughly esti-
mated at $7.3 million, based on an average cost of $66 per mis-
demeanor case.04 Applying the 1-to-10 population-ratio projec-
61. CCCJ, 1972 PLAN 9. The categories of cases covered by this cost in-
cluded felony and misdemeanor prosecutions, and juvenile petitions for ward-
ships and mental illness and narcotics commitments.
62. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADWN., Ex-
PENDITURE AND EMPLOYMENT DATA FOR THE CrIM. JUSTICE SYSTEM 15 (1969-
70).
63. In 1964, Silverstein estimated that it would cost $62.5 million to provide
representation to indigents in misdemeanor cases. DEFENSE OF THE POOR 125.
This estimate was based upon a 12 state misdemeanor caseload projection of
$1.25 million, at a cost of $50 per case for assigned counsel or defender services.
64. Misdemeanors, as defined herein, do not include minor traffic offenses.
The $66 per misdemeanor case cost is derived by dividing the total cost ($18.5
million) by a total of 269,000 weighted case "units." These weighted units are
calculated by applying a weight of two to the felony caseload on the basis that
the average misdemeanor case requires only one-half the work of one felony case.
Thus, for these calculations, 69,000 indigent felony cases in California during
1970 would convert to 138,000 misdemeanor case units. Misdemeanor case
units-calculated on the basis of one case equivalent to a case unit-would
total 110,000. Juvenile cases, which represent the other major category of
indigent cases, must be reduced in weight by a factor of .67, on the basis that
the average workload for a single juvenile case is equivalent to .67 misdemeanor
cases. Thus, approximately 31,000 indigent juvenile cases in which there were
appointed counsel in California during 1970 would convert to 21,000 misde-
meanor case units. Dividing the $18.5 million total cost by the total of
269,000 weighted units for all three case categories (felonies, misdemeanors
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tion, it may be concluded that an expenditure of $73 million
would be required for indigent misdemeanor defense in state
and local courts throughout the nation.65
The California misdemeanor unit cost of $66 calculated above
may be readily applied to the indigent caseload of any community
to determine the approximate costs for supplying counsel to mis-
demeanants. For example, in the city of Cleveland, Ohio, a
recent study estimated that 4,000 misdemeanor cases annually
would require the service of appointed counsel."" Applying the
$66 misdemeanor unit cost calculated above, it may be concluded
that an expenditure of $264,000 would be required for misde-
meanor defense services in Cleveland which would conform to
California standards. 7
Assuming the accuracy of the above projections indicating
and juveniles) results in a misdemeanor weighted unit cost of $66. Multiplying
this cost by the total indigent misdemeanor caseload of 110,000 produces a total
cost of $7.3 million for indigent misdemeanant representation in California during
1970.
The caseload data for misdemeanors and felonies relied upon in making
the above calculations was derived from case filings reported in the CALIF.
JUDICIAL COUNCIL'S 1971 ANNUAL REPORT 176, 180, 189. An indigency factor
of 25% for misdemeanors and 60% for felonies has been applied based on the
experience of California public defenders. See also DEFENSE OF THE POOR 125,
which also estimates a 25% indigency for misdemeanants. In the absence of
other more reliable data, indigent juvenile case units are estimated on the basis of
a recent unofficial caseload survey of California defender offices showing an
average 1:28 ratio of misdemeanor to juvenile cases among those offices.
65. This estimate compares with an estimate of $62.5 million based on the
1962 data. Dollars and Sense 1249, 1264; DEFENSE OF THE POOR 123.
66. Katz, A Report to the Court Management Project on Right to Counsel
in Misdemeanor Cases in Cuyahoga County 12 (1972).
67. In the report, cited note 66 supra, Katz expressed the opinion that rep-
resentation could be provided by a staff of only four attorneys handling 1800
cases each. That caseload was based upon the experience of the Cook County,
Illinois, Public Defender's Office, which is reputedly one of the most over-
worked and understaffed defender offices in the country. Furthermore, the
assembly-line process of municipal courts in Cook County is probably one of the
worst examples of that evil which was criticized in Argersinger. See Justice
on Trial-A Special Report, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 8, 1971, at 16.
"Effective" representation cannot be provided, in any sense of that term,
when each attorney is required to handle 1800 cases per year (more than 7
cases each working day). Where such caseloads have been imposed upon public
defender attorneys, the representation is characterized by quick pleas following
whispered interviews and en masse bull-pen advisement of rights. Such prac-
tices by certain public defender and legal aid programs have generated much
criticism toward the public defender system in general. If the spirit of the
Argersinger decision as enunciated in the majority opinion is to be realized, it
is imperative that reasonable caseload standards be adopted. The Cook County
experience is clearly not such a standard.
The fact that the Cook County misdemeanor caseload is excessive is also
indicated by the substantially lower standard of 600 cases recommended by the
NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIM. JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, WORKING
PAPERS OF THE NAT'L CONFERENCE ON CRIM. JUSTICE 179 [hereinafter cited as
NAT'L CONFERENCE ON CRIM. JUSTICE].
ARGERSINGER
that state and local governments must raise their expenditures
for indigent defense from $46.4 million to a total of $185 mil-
lion, including $73 million for misdemeanor assistance, then quite
obviously, they face a considerable financial burden in attempt-
ing to comply with Argersinger. The various methods and the
potential sources of financial assistance available to accomplish
this will now be considered.
Unfortunately, in most states, the financial burden of pro-
viding counsel falls upon local governments. These local jurisdic-
tions (mostly counties) are currently faced with heavy fiscal
problems, aggravated by a tendency of state governments to dele-
gate more and more responsibilities without providing adequate
financial assistance. Other disadvantages suffered by these local
jurisdictions include state-imposed limitations on their taxing
authority, and a reluctance to assist accused persons because of
public insensitivity to the rights of criminal defendants.18
The past inadequacy of local funding of defender services
has led to a recommendation that the states should take more
direct responsibility for such assistance. 9 Three possible methods
for state involvement include: 1) state authorization of additional
local sources of revenue; 2) direct payment of state funds to local
governments; and 3) direct provision of services by the state itself.
Direct state funding presents a number of difficulties. 70
These include the problem of devising standards for allocating the
money among local governments and for determining how it
should be spent (e.g., the cases covered, the quality and quantity
of services, the staff salaries). Another problem is that of audit-
ing local governments to insure that state funds are being properly
expended in accordance with statutory requirements. Such con-
siderations have caused several authorities to recommend that the
states take over the operation of defender programs and conduct
them on a state-wide basis.7 '
68. An example of this attitude in the author's experience was the remark of
a former county supervisor during a hearing on the public defender office
budget, to the effect that he couldn't understand why the county had to spend
money to get the criminals out of jail, while at the same time spending money
to put them there in the first place.
69. U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-
LOCAL RELATIONS IN THE CRIM. JUSTICE SYSTEM 52 (1971). The Commission
has cited local funding as the "principal cause of the poor response . . . in many
States" to the Supreme Court's earlier mandate for legal services in felony cases.
70. See remarks of Clarence A.H. Meyer, Attorney General for the State of
Nebraska, REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L DEFENDER CONFERENCE 38
(May 14-16, 1969).
71. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISS'RS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, MODEL
PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT (1970); Nat'l Defender Project of NLADA, REPORT OF
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Federal assistance to the states and local governments has
also been recommended to relieve their financial burden. Such
assistance is probably a necessity for a large number of relatively
poor states and counties which can not be expected to provide
adequate compensation for appointed counsel because of their
very limited financial resources.7 1
There are a number of indications that federal financing for
indigent representation in state courts may not be far off. No
less a spokesman for the legal profession than former President of
the American Bar Association, Robert W. Meserve, has acknowl-
edged that justification exists for federal assistance to the states
and local governments on the basis that "a significant part of
the increased cost can be attributed to the implementation of federal
constitutional rights. '78
Ample precedent exists for federal financing of legal serv-
ices in the states. State and local health, education and welfare
services have been heavily financed by federal contributions.
More significantly, civil legal services have been supported by
substantial federal contributions as part of the Office of Econo-
mic Opportunity (OEO) "War on Poverty" Program. Although
federal assistance to civil legal services is now being curtailed,
the Administration has shown considerable interest in problems
associated with the Argersinger decision. This has been mani-
fested in several large grant awards from the Law Enforcement
Assistance Administration to finance a variety of studies on the
impact of Argersinger.74
PROCEEDINGS OF THE NAT'L DEFENDER CONFERENCE, Wash., D.C., 37, 121
(1969); REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note
25, at 151; U.S. ADVISORY COMM'N ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra
note 69, at 52.
The prefatory note of the Uniform Law Commissioners' 1970 Model Pub-
lic Defender Act includes a reference to the "Model Defender Act" adopted in
1966. After acknowledging the propriety of its procedural aspects, the Commis-
sion observed that the 1966 Act was unsatisfactory in regard to its so-called
"county option" plan which left the decision to each county on whether to
establish a public defender or other type of system for providing counsel. Quoting
from the 1967 PRESIDENT'S CRIME COMM'N REPORT, the Commissioners con-
cluded that, "[e]ach state should finance assigned counsel and defender systems
on a regular and statewide basis." NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAws, MODEL PUBLIC DEFENDER ACT 3 (1970).
72. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 159. An example of such a
community is the Town of Wood, South Dakota, which was described in the
concurring opinion of Justice Powell in Argersinger; see note 52 and accom-
panying text supra.
73. Speech delivered to the Los Angeles County Bar Association, Oct., 1972.
74. These have included a $100,000 grant to NLADA to survey the fifty
states to determine the adequacy of defender services; a grant of $257,000 to the
Center for Criminal Justice at Boston University to finance an 18-month study
on ways to implement the Argersinger decision; a grant of $54,000 to the Na-
tional Center for State Courts to study the various systems (appointed and public
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These indications seem to make almost certain the prospect
of some form of federal assistance for state and local defender
services. The manner in which such aid would be provided is
unknown at this time. But the Administration's current fondness
for revenue-sharing suggests that this approach is a very distinct
possibility. Other suggestions include a National Defender Com-
mission to provide assistance in establishing and expanding de-
fender programs and a federally-funded State Criminal Justice
Act"6 to assist the states in providing the same legal services in
state courts that are now provided in the federal courts. 76
The type of system adopted by a particular community may
substantially influence the cost of providing counsel. A number
of studies have concluded that a public defender program is more
economical in an urban area than is a system of appointment of
private counsel. 77  Despite this economic advantage, however,
one authority has contended that there are long-range benefits
in a dual system which justify at least some additional costs. 78
One benefit cited was a greater frequency of jury trials under the
private counsel system-such trials serving "a worthwhile stan-
dard-setting function. '79
The advantages of a public defender system, according to
its proponents, include the expertise provided by experienced
criminal lawyers and the supervision and training afforded to
young lawyers in such a program.80
defender) for providing defense counsel to indigents and to culminate in a re-
port to be entitled, Prescriptive Package on Argersinger v. Hamlin. Letter from
James Boczar, Technology Transfer Division, Nat'l Institute of Law Enforcement"
and Crim. Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Ad., Apr. 11, 1973.
75. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970).
76. See Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indigent Accused: The Effect of
Argersinger, 30 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 203, 207 (1972).
77. See Anderson, Defense of Indigents in Maine-The Need for Public
Defenders, 25 MAINE L. REv. 1 (1973); Goodell, Effective Assistance of Coun-
sel in Criminal Cases: Public Defender or Assigned Counsel, KAN. STATE B.J.
339 (1970); Note, Analysis and Comparison of the Assigned Counsel and Public
Defender Systems, 49 N.C.L. REV. 705 (1971).
The Kansas Bar study reported a felony case cost comparison in Colorado of
$108 for defenders and $486 for private counsel. In North Carolina, costs were
reported at $94 per case for defender representation compared to $185 for as-
signed private counsel. In Santa Clara County, California, a cost comparison
during 1971-72 showed a per-case cost of $80 for defender cases compared to
$385 for assigned private counsel.
See also Dollars and Sense, supra note 47, at 1263-64, estimating a nation-
wide variance of approximately 20 million dollars between public defender and
private counsel costs for legal services for indigent misdemeanants.
78. D. OAKS & W. LEHMAN, A CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE INDI-
GENT 162-64 (1968).
79. Id. at 164.
80. Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indigent Accused, supra note 76, at
206. The authors also stress the disadvantages of the appointed private counsel
system, such as the fact that appointments often depend on judges' favors, and if
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B. The Demand for Capable Legal Manpower
The number of lawyers needed to supply the legal services
required by Argersinger is as difficult to assess as the financial
cost for the same reason-a lack of reliable statistics. As hereto-
fore noted, Mr. Justice Douglas' majority opinion referred to
an estimate of between 1,575 to 2,300 additional attorneys re-
quired to represent indigent misdemeanants. 8' That estimate
was from an Iowa Law Review note which had made the pro-
jection on the basis of statistics cited by the President's Crime
Commission.82 The Crime Commission in turn took those statis-
tics from "rough estimates" and a "crude survey" by a 1966 Con-
ference on Legal Manpower Needs."3
In the absence of reliable, current statistics, an estimate of
legal manpower demands will be made here on the basis of a pro-
jection of California data. In 1970, there were approximately
110,000 indigent persons charged with misdemeanor offenses in
California. 4  Multiplying that number by ten on the basis of the
ratio of California's population to the nation's indicates that a
total of about 1.1 million persons charged with misdemeanors
annually require the services of appointed counsel. An estimate
of the number of attorneys needed to handle these cases may
then be determined by dividing that number by an acceptable
attorney misdemeanor caseload.
The Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Criminal
Law in 1966 estimated that an attorney working full-time could
provide adequate representation in misdemeanor cases at a rate
'of between 300 and 1,000 cases per year." The Crime Commis-
sion further estimated that a single lawyer working full-time
could provide representation in 300 to 400 serious misdemeanor
cases and 1,200 social nuisance cases, or in 600 of the remaining
too many motions are filed which may irritate the judges, attorneys who file
such motions are apt not to be appointed again. Another problem is the likeli-
hood that private counsel may give more time to paying clients than to those
represented on assignment for limited fees.
81. 407 U.S. at 37 n.7.
82. Dollars and Sense, supra note 47, at 1261, citing TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 56, at 55-56.
83. Report of the Conference on Legal Manpower Needs of Crim. Law,
Airlie House, Va., 41 F.R.D. 389, 392-93 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Confer-
ence on Legal Manpower Needs]. The Conference report complained about a
lack of adequate statistics which hampered determinations concerning the
"need" for lawyers, and noted "two distinct needs": 1) for accurate information
about the current situation, and 2) for standard procedures for collecting and
reporting relevant information. Id. at 394-95.
84. As previously noted, this figure is derived by applying a 25% indigency
rate to the total number of misdemeanor filings in California during 1970.
See note 64 supra.
85. Conference on Legal Manpower Needs 393.
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misdemeanor cases.86
Applying the 600 caseload average to the 1.1. million indi-
gent misdemeanor cases estimated above indicates that approxi-
mately 1,840 attorneys would be required to handle these cases.
It would seem that this need could be readily satisfied by the
more than 300,000 lawyers in the United States.87  However,
only a very small fraction of that number have handled criminal
matters on more than an occasional basis. In 1966 the Legal
Manpower Conference estimated that the number of such attor-
neys ranged between 2,500 and 5,000.88 That range represents
only between 1% and 2% of the approximately 236,000 lawyers
engaged in private practice. 9 Furthermore, in addition to the
1,840 lawyers required for indigent misdemeanor defense, there
remains a need for approximately 5,520 attorneys required for the
balance of the non-indigent misdemeanor caseload. 90
In addition to the attorneys required to defend misdemeanor
cases, the number of attorneys required to defend felony pros-
ecutions must also be considered in assessing the availability of
legal manpower for Argersinger purposes. On the basis of a pro-
jection of California data, it may be estimated that an additional
5,500 attorneys would be required to handle felony cases nation-
wide. 91 Thus, approximately 12,680 attorneys, or roughly 21/
times the estimated number available would be required for mis-
demeanor and felony cases alone, not to speak of those needed
in juvenile cases, nor more significantly those required to swell
the ranks of prosecutor offices to meet the additional workload
resulting from more defense lawyers.
Assuming the correctness of these calculations, the supply of
lawyers to handle criminal cases on a regular basis will have to
be substantially increased to meet the demand for legal manpower
generated by Argersinger. Two current trends should facilitate
the availability of such manpower. One is the shrinking demand
for lawyers in the personal injury-tort field as a result of the
86. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 56. More recently, the National
Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice Standards has recommended an average
misdemeanor caseload of 400 cases per year on the basis of the "increased com-
plexity" of the practice of criminal law. See NAT'L CONFERENCE ON CRIM.
JUSTICE, note 67 supra.
87. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 159 (1972).
88. Conference on Legal Manpower Needs, supra note 83, at 394.
89. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 159 (1972).
90. This number represents the remainder of 7,360 attorneys needed to
handle a projected total of 4.4 million misdemeanor cases, derived from Cal-
ifornia data.
91. This number is derived by taking an estimated 1.1 million cases resulting
from a ten-fold projection of California felony filings in 1970 (115,000), and
applying a 200 caseload rate based on estimates of the Crime Commission. See
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 55.
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movement to adopt no-fault automobile insurance legislation. At
the same time, in the past few years there has been a substantial
increase in law school enrollment, and this trend promises to
continue. 2 The combination of these two situations will un-
doubtedly create an overabundance of lawyers to meet the swell-
ing manpower demands resulting from Argersinger.
A more difficult problem than the availability of a suffi-
cient number of lawyers to meet the demands of Argersinger will
be that of insuring attorney competence in the practice of crimi-
nal law. In recent years, criminal law has become increasingly
complex due in large part to the so-called criminal law revolution
resulting from decisions of the Warren Court. Accordingly, the
President's Crime Commission has stressed the urgent need for
improving the standards of competence and training of defense
counsel in criminal cases.93
The competency of criminal practitioners is important for
two reasons. First, it is desirable from an efficiency standpoint
to insure that cases are promptly handled without undue delay.
In addition, effective representation is mandated by the sixth
amendment. 4  While that requirement has long been ignored, "5
more recently, appellate courts have become highly sensitive to
post-conviction claims of incompetency of counsel in criminal
cases.
9
92. In the decade from 1961 to 1971, law school enrollment more than
doubled, increasing from 41,499 to 94,468. During the same period, new annual
admissions to the bar climbed from 10,729 to 17,922. On the basis of law
school enrollments, the projection for new admissions to the bar indicates that
there will be 29,000 new lawyers who will be admitted in 1974-up 12,000
from 1970. It is further anticipated that by 1985 the number of lawyers in the
United States in 1971 (342,935) will have doubled. Ruud, That Burgeoning
Law School Enrollment, 58 A.B.A.J. 146-47 (1972).
Without considering the requirements of Argersinger, the occupational op-
portunities for lawyers are not expected to keep pace with this growth. Thus,
before Argersinger, it was estimated that job openings for attorneys until 1980
would be only about 14,500 annually. Id. at 148, citing U.S. DFP'T OF LABOR,
OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (1970-1971 ed.).
93. REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY, supra note
25, at 152; TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 61-64.
94. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
95. See Lumbard, The Adequacy of Lawyers Now in Criminal Practice,
47 J. AM. JUD. Soc'Y 176, 177-80 (1963), criticizing the bench and bar for
"sweeping the whole business under the rug."
96. See, e.g., Cooks v. United States, 461 F.2d 530 (5th Cir. 1972) (er-
roneous plea bargain advice); Gomez v. Beto, 462 F.2d 596 (5th Cir. 1972)
(failure to investigate alibi defense); Johns v. Perini, 462 F.2d 1308 (6th Cir.
1972) (failure to investigate alibi defense); Barber v. Nelson, 451 F.2d 1017
(9th Cir. 1971) (failure to confer and prepare for probation revocation hear-
ing); Colson v. Smith, 438 F.2d 1075 (5th Cir. 1971) (plea of guilty induced by
unprepared attorney); U.S. ex rel. Washington v. Maroney, 428 F.2d 10 (3d
Cir. 1970) (brief ten-minute consultation before trial); Zavala v. Craven, 433
F.2d 335 (9th Cir. 1970) (failure to make a "knock-and-notice" search objec-
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Thus, the problem of adequacy of counsel to meet the re-
quirements of Argersinger is not merely one of supply, but in-
volves the equally important matter of well-trained, competent
legal personnel.
A number of important activities are now going on which
should bring about a substantial increase in the number of trained
criminal lawyers. These include a vast expansion in clinical stu-
dent programs, internships for law students in prosecutor and de-
fender offices, increased continuing legal education seminars on
criminal law subjects, and a unique pilot program in the state of
California for certification of criminal law specialists.
In his concurrence in Argersinger, Mr. Justice Brennan ex-
pressed the opinion that law students in clinical programs could
provide "a significant contribution, quantitatively and qualita-
tively, to the representation of the poor . . . " to alleviate any
legal manpower burden imposed by the new decision. 7  While
there are a large number of excellent clinical law programs,"8 it
is seriously questionable whether they can provide an immediate
source of substantial manpower to meet the demands imposed by
the Argersinger decision. As one critic of Justice Brennan's
view has pointed out, law schools are designed to teach, and if
they are given the operational assignment of defending indigents
as well, without the intense supervision required, such clinical
programs will be unable to provide effective representation, which
will cause a disenchantment with clinical education."' Skilled
tion); Brubaker v. Kickson, 310 F.2d 30 (9th Cir. 1962) (failure to raise mental
defense); People v. Shells, 4 Cal. 3d 626, 483 P.2d 1227, 94 Cal. Rptr. 275
(1971) (erroneous advice to admit a prior conviction and not take the stand
to avoid impeachment); In re Smith, 3 Cal. 3d 192, 474 P.2d 969, 90 Cal. Rptr.
1 (1970) (failure to raise lineup identification issue on appeal); People v. Ibarra,
60 Cal. 2d 460, 386 P.2d 487, 34 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1963) (failure to raise search
objection); In re Greenfield, 11 Cal. App. 3d 536, 543-44, 89 Cal. Rptr. 847,
851 (1970) (failure to recognize "special statute" defense described as "inexcus-
able carelessness . . . so egregious as to promote self scrutiny by the courts,
licensing authorities and law schools whose combined auspices turned loose such
ineptness"); People v. Jasso, 2 Cal. App. 3d 955, 82 Cal. Rptr. 229 (1969)
(failure to raise a novel search objection).
97. 407 U.S. at 41, referring to the existence of 125 such programs going
on among 147 accredited law schools, with 57 involved in the correctional field,
assisting prisoners with applications for post-conviction relief.
98. An excellent example of an outstanding student program is one that
has been conducted at the University of Minnesota providing representation to
indigents in misdemeanor cases. See Sedgwick & Oliphant, Judicial Reflections
on Law Students in Court and the Argersinger v. Hamlin Decision 1972 (an
unpublished article available from the Nat'l Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n)
[hereinafter cited as Sedgwick & Oliphant].
Under the University of Minnesota program, law students handle all public
defender arraignments two days a week in the Minneapolis Traffic and Criminal
Misdemeanor Court under the direct supervision of two law school professors.
Weekly seminars are held. They also do trial work under supervision.
99. Strong, VIRGINIA LAW WEEKLY, DICTA, Vol. XXV, No. 3 (1972). The
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faculty supervision of law students is essential in order to assure
quality of work and to prevent the students from acquiring un-
sound attitudes and practices.100
Given the financial plight of most law schools, their ability
to provide careful supervision is quite limited, thereby substan-
tially restricting the volume of cases which such programs can
handle. Thus, law student programs cannot be depended upon
for any immediate, substantial manpower benefits beyond para-
legal assistance such as investigation, interview of clients and
witnesses, and legal research.
Nevertheless, clinical law student programs do afford a
number of potential long-range advantages. These stem from the
involvement and the training of more young lawyers in the crimi-
nal field. It may be anticipated that, as a result of their exposure
to criminal practice, many of these students will later become
prosecutors and defense attorneys, and will thereby help to fill
the growing demands for skilled criminal lawyers. This contact
may also inspire other students, who may become legislators, gov-
ernment officials and leaders of the bench and bar, to work for
improvement of the criminal courts. 10 1
Other methods of criminal law training for lawyers to meet
the demands of Argersinger are post-graduate courses and bar
association continuing legal education programs. An example
author blamed the short supply of needed faculty supervisors on "the long-
standing and notorious financial anemia that afflicts the law schools."
100. In an article on the successful University of Minnesota program, it was
noted that:
[q]uality supervision of a student program is extremely important to
its success. Experience has led us to conclude that students cannot
perform adequately without a carefully structured, carefully supervised
program . . . . A student can never be left to handle a trial or put in
a plea of any kind without first conferring at length with his experi-
enced supervisor.
Students should also be evaluated at every stage of their work in
-the program. This means that evaluations are made on their pre-trial
preparation (including interviewing), the trial work and post-trial
work. No aspect of a student's efforts should be overlooked.
Sedgwick & Oliphant, supra note 98, at 18.
These views are confirmed by this author's personal experience with clinical
law student programs over the past five years. in cooperation with the University
of Santa Clara and Stanford University. Trial work naturally requires intensive
supervision. On the other hand, after careful training, third year students with
minimum supervision can be relied upon for assistance in conducting client and
witness interviews and for preparing legal memoranda and briefs. See Bird,
Supporting Services for Defenders-Students, 31 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 385 (1973),
describing in detail the student programs of the Santa Clara County Public
Defender's Office, including a highly innovative training project carried on in
cooperation with Stanford University.
101. Student programs often succeed in attracting brighter students who arc
eager to deal with live clients and cases and to escape the boredom of academic
routine, particularly after their second year. See Sedgwick & Oliphant, supra
note 98, at 13-14, 18.
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of the latter type is the Criminal Advocacy Institutes of the Prac-
ticing Law Institute (PLI).11 2  In California, the Continuing Ed-
ucation of the Bar, a program sponsored by the State Bar in co-
operation with the University of California, has presented sev-
eral informative criminal law seminars and has produced two ex-
cellent texts.10
3
Law schools have also offered post-graduate criminal law
courses in the past,10 4 and they are likely to increase such offer-
ings if the demand arises. 105
A related development which should contribute substan-
tially to upgrading the quality of criminal law expertise is Cali-
fornia's new pilot program, for certification of legal specialists.
Criminal law is one of three specialties included in the new pro-
gram, which was initiated last March. 0 6 It allows qualified
California lawyers to represent themselves as criminal law spec-
ialists. The requirements for certification are stringent and in-
clude educational as well as experiential criteria. Qualifying ed-
ucational courses must be approved by a Board of Specialization,
which administers the entire program. 10 7  If this experiment
proves successful, it will provide an important new method for
improving the quality of criminal law practice.
In addition to training additional lawyers in order to meet
the new demands of Argersinger, criminal legal services can also
be expanded by greater utilization of para-legal personnel to as-
sist lawyers with work which does not require their direct atten-
tion and expertise. Investigation and stenographic services are
traditional examples of such para-legal assistance. Initial inter-
viewing and legal research and writing are other examples. Less
traditional kinds of services are those performed by social workers
102. Shortly after the Argersinger decision, PLI's Fifth Annual Criminal Ad-
vocacy Institute featured topics on the impact of the decision and on effective
techniques in defending misdemeanants. See PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE
FIFTH ANNUAL CRIMINAL ADVOCACY INSTITUTE (1972).
103. CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE VOL. I (1964), VOL. II (1969) (CALIFORNIA
CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR).
104. One of the most well-known of these is Northwestern's annual Short
Course for Defense Lawyers in Criminal Cases, which attracts lawyers through.
out the country.
105. In response to a new criminal law specialist program in California, the
University of Santa Clara has recently announced a new post-graduate course on
post-conviction remedies.
106. The other fields of law which are included are Taxation and Workmen's
Compensation. See Standards for Specialization Announced, 48 CALIF. STATE
B.J. 80 (1973).
107. As soon as the California experiment began, several approved criminal
law courses were announced, including a video-taped, state-wide program by the
State Bar's Continuing Education of the Bar.
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or other lay persons, such as ex-offenders, to develop sentencing
alternatives or diversion programs.'0 8
C. The Burden Upon The Courts
1. The Present Situation and the Possible Effects of the
Decision
The majority of the Court in Argersinger, as heretofore
noted, seemed to ignore the potential effect of its decision upon
an already overburdened lower court system. That circum-
stance was only alluded to in the Court's opinion in its reference
to the assembly-line character of the lower court system as addi-
tional justification for the aid of counsel in such courts. How-
ever, the concurring minority opinion placed great stress on this
problem, predicting that the across-the-board requirement of coun-
sel would "exacerbate" the situation. 10 9
The congestion which has plagued big-city lower courts has
been well-documented." 0 Probably the worst example is the
situation in New York City, where arraignment courts process
a daily minimum of 200 cases each and calendar courts between
100 and 250 cases, with judges unable to spend more than one
or two minutes per defendant to decide questions of bail."'
As of this writing, Argersinger's impact upon these courts
is as yet indiscernible. An advance prediction by one authority-
that such a decision would sound the death knell of the lower
108. See Wald, The Use of Social Workers in a Public Defender Office-An
Evaluation of the Defender Rehabilitation Project of the Public Defender Office
for Santa Clara County, Feb. 1972 (unpublished report available at the Office
of the Public Defender. San Jose); Boroch, Ellis & Loiacono, Offender Re-
habilitation Project, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 174 (1970); Ginsberg, Law Reform
and Defender Services, 29 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 161 (1971).
New responsibilities for defense lawyers in developing sentencing alterna-
tives are described in ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNC-
TION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION, § 8.1, at 285 (1971). See also TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 56, at 19; NAT'L CONFERENCE ON CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note
67, at C-218-29; Portman, The Defense Lawyer's New Role in the Sentencing
Process, 34 FEDERAL PROBATION 3 (1970).
109. See discussion in note 43 supra.
110. See Whitebread, MASS PRODUCTION JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL
IDEAL (Papers Presented and Proceedings of a Conference on Problems Associ-
ated with the Misdemeanor 1970) [hereinafter cited as MASS PRODUCTION JUS-
TICE].
111. MASS-PRODUCTION JUSTICE 147.
The assembly-line aspect of these courts has been well described by one
observer as follows:
[G]reat numbers of defendants are processed by harrassed and
overworked officials . . . [with] scant regard for them as individuals.
They are numbers on dockets, faceless ones to be processed and sent
on their way.
Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production, in THE AMERICAN
ASSEMBLY, THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC AND THE LAW EXPLOSION, 87 (1965).
[Vol. 14
ARGERSINGER
court, mass justice system-is, as yet, unfulfilled. 112  A contrary
prediction-that such a "fiat from on high" would result in com-
pliance "in form rather than in substance"-may well be more
accurate."'
The accuracy of the latter prediction is reflected in a report
of the response to Argersinger by municipal court judges in
Cuyahoga County, Ohio. Without any state assistance, and able
to rely only upon Legal Aid Society lawyers supplemented by
volunteer, uncompensated attorneys, these courts have been re-
portedly following " . . . the general practice, whether overt or
covert, . . . [of] encourag[ing] defendants to waive the right
and proceed on their own, if for no other reason than the ab-
sence of an attorney on the scene to counsel a person how to
plead. '114
2. Required Solutions
A collapse of the assembly-line process of justice in the lower
criminal courts is a consequence devoutly to be wished. No
greater blot upon American justice can be imagined. In its down-
fall lies the best hope for reform. Only then may it be antici-
pated that state and local legislatures will at last respond and
provide the additional judges, prosecutors and defense attorneys
needed for the proper administration of criminal justice in these
courts. 115
112. Katz, Municipal Courts-Another Urban Ill, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
87, 125 (1968). Professor Katz supports his view by citing statistics showing
how much slower case dispositions are when defendants are represented by
counsel. Thus, in a study of 1,034 cases in the Cleveland Municipal Court,
only 7.95% of 264 represented defendants were disposed of immediately, com-
pared to such dispositions for 63.78% of the unrepresented defendants. Further-
more, only 34.47% of the represented cases were disposed of within one month,
as compared with 84.59% of the unrepresented cases. Id. at 103.
113. Enker, Lower Courts, in MAss PRODUCTION JUSTICE 195 (1970). In
support of this prediction, Professor Enker referred to a description of the
manner of representation of indigent misdemeanants by a legal aid lawyer in
one large city. When the volume of cases was too heavy for one attorney to
handle individually, the attorney merely addressed all of the defendants as a
group in the bull-pen, advising them of their rights.
114. Katz, A Report to the Court Management Project on Right to Counsel
in Misdemeanor Cases in Cuyohoga County 5, 7 (1972). Further evidence
supporting Professor Enker's view is the report of a recent observer of the lower
court system in Boston, who commented that "[t]he principal difference between
the old system and the new one is that whereas most criminal defendants were
formerly run through the mill without a lawyer and convicted, now they are
run through the mill with a lawyer and convicted." Harris, Annals of Law in
Criminal Court-I, THE NEW YORKER, Apr. 14, 1973, at 81.
115. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations has pointed
out that an underlying cause of the problems of the lower courts is the neglect-
ful and negative attitude toward them by the public, the bar, and even the ju-
diciary. ADVISORY COMM. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, STATE-LoCAL
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In addition to an increase of staffing for judicial, prosecu-
tor and defense functions, effective lower court reform also re-
quires adequate training programs for lawyers and judges. Such
training is essential to insure the competence needed to cope with
the increased complexities of the modern criminal justice pro-
cess. 1 ' If such training can be provided along with adequate
RELATIONS IN THE CRIM. JUSTICE SYSTEM (1971). This neglect has persisted de-
spite repeated studies which have amply documented the problems of these
courts. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 29, citing CLEVELAND FOUNDA-
TION, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 88 (Pound & Frankfurter ed. 1922), RE-
PORT OF THE BALTIMORE COMM. ON THE ADMIN. OF JUSTICE UNDER EMERGENCY
CONDITIONS 17 (1923), NAT'L COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT
(The Wickersham Comm'n) (1931), SHERIDAN, URBAN JUSTICE (1964), SUBIN,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT (1966).
In the light of its own observations and the earlier studies, the Crime Com-
mission issued the following admonition:
No program of crime prevention will be effective without a massive
overhaul of the lower criminal courts. The many persons who en-
counter these courts each year can hardly fail to interpret that experi-
ence as an expression of indifference to their situations and to the
ideals of fairness, equality, and rehabilitation professed in theory, yet
frequently denied in practice. The result may be a hardening of anti-
social attitudes in many defendants and the creation of obstacles to
the successful adjustment of others.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 56, at 29.
Unfortunately, despite this warning, the lower court system has been virtu-
ally ignored, while massive amounts of federal money under the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act have been spent for other criminal justice (prin-
cipally law enforcement) activities. See NAT'L LEGAL AID AND DEFENDER ASS'N,
THE DOLLARS AND SENSE OF JUSTICE-A STUDY OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (LEAA) 15-21 (1973), reporting on the "low pri-
ority" which has been given to the court function for funding by LEAA. Over
the first three years of the LEAA program (1969-1971), a mere 2.55o of discre-
tionary grant funds, and only about 6% of state block grant funds were allocated
to the courts.
116. The need for such training for judges as well as lawyers has been
stressed by the Advisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions
of the American Bar Association, Project on Minimum Standards for Criminal
Justice as follows:
The participants in criminal trials can not meet today's exacting
standards unless they make themselves virtual specialists, giving close
and constant study to the decisions of recent years. This underscores
the need for continuity in prosecution offices and continuing in-service
training. On the defense side, similar study and training is called for.
Many observers see the need for expertise as a reason for wider in-
stitutionalized legal aid and public defender offices having permanent
staffs and auxiliary services comparable to the prosecution offices.
See ABA STANDARDS, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES §§ 3.1-3.3 (Approved Draft
1968).
The need to cast as much light as possible on the nature of the
lawyer's role and function in criminal justice is manifested in at least
three major contexts. The first of these is the education of law stu-
dents, the bar and the bench.
ABA, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE
FUNCTION 8-9 (Approved Draft 1971) (emphasis added).
An extremely promising training study is presently being conducted for
the three major components of the criminal justice system-police, courts and
corrections-under a $1.6 million LEAA grant. The program, entitled "Project
STAR", an acronym for Systems and Training Analysis of Requirements for
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supervision, then the adverse effects of what Mr. Justice Powell
referred to as the overzealousness of young defense attorneys
(which affects young prosecutors as well) can be avoided.
A well-organized public defender program probably offers
the best method for providing the supervision and training which
young defense lawyers need to guide them in this complex field
and to teach them the technical knowledge and skills required
by modern criminal law practice. Without this training and guid-
ance, they are very likely to demand unnecessary hearings and
file frivolous motions, as suggested by Mr. Justice Powell-not
merely because of their overzealousness, but also because of an
excess of caution resulting from their lack of knowledge and ex-
perience. 117
The problem of overburdened lower criminal courts can also
be alleviated by decriminalization of many victimless crimes and
by diversionary programs. Offenses which would be likely sub-
jects for decriminalization are traffic violations, public intoxica-
tion, prostitution, obscentity, certain forms of disorderly conduct,
and sexual offenses between consenting adults. 1 ' Of these, the
leading candidate for decriminalization is public intoxication,
which accounts for about one out of every three arrests in the
United States." 9
Criminal Justice Participants, was conceived by a group of innovative law en-
forcement officials of California's Commission on Peace Officers Standards and
Training (P.O.S.T.). In 1971, P.O.S.T. obtained the LEAA grant and contracted
with the American Justice Institute-a consulting firm-to conduct the training
study and development program in four states-California, Michigan, New Jersey
and Texas. The consultant receives guidance from a National Advisory Council
and specialized task forces (police, courts and corrections). The Council con-
sists of representatives of all participants in the criminal justice field, together
with educators and local government representatives. By 1974 the project will
complete work on the development of model training programs for use by police,
prosecutors, defense attorneys, judges and correctional officers. See Calif.
Comm'n on Peace Officer Standards and Training, Systems and Training Analy-
sis of Requirements for the Crim. Justice System, Sixth Quarterly Progress Report
January, 1973 (an unpublished report available from Mr. Gene Muehleisen,
Project Director, Project STAR, 7100 Bowling Dr., Suite 250, Sacramento, CA.).
117. The advantages of implementing Argersinger by means of a public
defender system have been discussed in Goldberg & Hartman, Help for the Indi-
gent Accused, supra note 76, at 2-5. Among those advantages the authors stress
"professionalism and expertise" and "adequate supervision and training." See also
Portman, Public Defender Office Administration, 29 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 107,
111 (1971), describing various in-house methods for training defenders, includ-
ing regular office meetings, training seminars, and a newsletter digest of recent
cases.
118. See MORRIS & HAWKINS, THE HONEST POLITICIAN'S GUIDE TO CRIME
CONTROL 3 (1970).
119. REPORT ON THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SocIETY, supra note 25,
at 233. California belatedly responded to this recommendation in 1971 by enact-
ing a provision authorizing a police officer to place a public drunk in "civil
protective custody" in a facility designated for a 72-hour treatment and evalua-
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An increasingly popular method of dealing with petty of-
fenders is the "diversion" process, originated by the renowned
Vera Institute of Manhattan. 120  Diversion has been defined as
"halting or suspending before conviction formal criminal proceed-
ings against a person on the condition or assumption that he will
do something in return.' 121  The criminal offense is not changed,
but the offender is "diverted" from the system, thereby avoiding
conviction.
A typical example would be the taking of an intoxicated per-
son into custody and later releasing him to his family or a detoxi-
fication center. Another example would be that of holding formal
charges in abeyance while a defendant participates in a rehabili-
tative program. An essential characteristic of the process is the
exercise of official discretion to allow an alternative to prosecution
in dealing with a particular defendant.
In addition to lessening the burden upon the court system
by avoidance of formal proceedings, diversion also has the ad-
vantages of allowing the offender to avoid the stigma of a crimi-
nal conviction and bringing to bear community rehabilitative re-
sources, earlier and more effectively, in a more flexible and in-
formal way.'1 2  However, diversion programs will not entirely
obviate the need for appointed counsel. Since diversion usually
tion of inebriates. CAL. PEN. CODE § 647(f) (West 1972). However, the state
legislature left it to local governments to establish and finance such facilities.
The result is that, two years later, no California county has yet established a
treatment facility under the act because of a lack of financing.
If California's experience is any indication, supplying counsel for public
drunk offenders is of little consequence despite the fact that many of them re-
ceive jail sentences. This is because most drunks, with rare exception, waive
the right to counsel, plead guilty and accept their jail sentences without com-
plaint.
120. See VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE RE-
FORM 78 (1972).
121. NAT'L CONFERENCE ON CRIM. JUSTICE, supra note 67, at 19.
122. The effectiveness of the diversion approach has been amply demonstrated
in the experience of the Vera Institute's Manhattan Court Employment Project.
During a 12-month period, the re-arrest rate for offenders who successfully com-
pleted the program was only 15.8% compared to 46.1% for those in a compari-
son control group. VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
REFORM 88-90 (1972). Similarly, a District of Columbia diversion program
known as "Project Crossroads" reported that, during a 15-month period, 140
out of 191 participants in its counseling and employment services program for
youthful first offenders successfully completed the program and had their charges
dismissed. Thereafter, they experienced a 22.2% recidivist arrest rate, com-
pared to the 51 who did not complete the program and who experienced a
56.8% recidivist rate. This compared very favorably with a 105-defendant con-
trol group, of which 50 had their charges dismissed and experienced a 44%
rate of recidivism; the other 55, who did not have their charges dismissed, experi-
enced a 47.3% recidivist rate. NAT'L CONFERENCE ON GRIM. JUSTICE, supra note
67, at 21, citing Leiberg, A Final Report to the Manpower Ad., U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, PROJECT CROSSROADS, NAT'L COMM. FOR CHILDREN AND YOUTH (1971).
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involves the interruption of formal court procedures after they
have been initiated, a defendant must decide whether to agree to
forego the opportunity to contest an accusation and to assume
the burdens of a rehabilitative program in which he may not be
successful. If innocent of the charge, diversion would be an
onerous and unnecessary obligation to undertake. Furthermore,
the delay could prejudice the preparation of his defense. To
avoid such prejudice and to assist a defendant with the decision
whether to accept diversion, appointment of counsel may be a
constitutional necessity. Beyond that, however, defense counsel
may be able to assist the diversion process by recommending al-
ternative plans which may be more suitable to a particular client's
needs. 123
III. CONCLUSION: THE POTENTIAL RETURNS
The Argersinger decision's demand for more lawyers in the
lower court criminal justice system portends several potential ben-
efits for the criminal justice system as a whole. Clinical student
programs, including internships, will undoubtedly increase in
number and size. This will not only create a new reservoir of
better-trained criminal lawyers, but it will also expose more stu-
dents to the problems of the lower court system, and inspire them
as future legislators and judges to support meaningful reforms. 124
Lower court reform should, in turn, generate a far greater
respect for law among those who are subjected to those courts.
123. Compare this with the role of defense counsel at sentencing as recom-
mended in the ABA Standards of the Defense Function, viz., that "in an ap-
propriate case [the defense attorney should] be prepared to suggest a program of
rehabilitation based on his exploration of employment, educational and other
opportunities made available by community services." ABA, STANDARDS ON THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION §8-1(b) at 285 (Approved
Draft 1971). See also two unpublished reports for Project STAR (discussed at
note 116 supra); FRIESEN, FUTURE ROLES OF JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND DE-
FENDERS 12 (1972); RESOVE, THE IMPACT OF SOCIAL TRENDS ON CRIME AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 61-62 (1973).
124. In the past, the practice of criminal law, particularly in the lower courts,
has been avoided like the plague by most reputable attorneys. That situation
seems to be changing due, perhaps, to the constitutional emphasis given to crimi-
nal practice in recent years. A significant manifestation of this interest is the
ABA's Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, which began in 1964 following
a proposal by the Institute of Judicial Administration at New York University
Law School. Coincidentally, the President of the ABA at the time the project
was initiated was Lewis F. Powell, Jr., now Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court and author of the concurring opinion in Argersinger.
Chief Justice Burger, then a United States Circuit Judge, was chairman of the
Supervisory Committee on the Prosecution and Defense Functions, and later
became Chairman of the Special Committee on Standards for the Administration
of Crim. Justice. See ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE,
STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNC-
TION v-viii (1971).
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Presently, much resentment toward the law undoubtedly results
from the existing obnoxious assembly-line procedures of the lower
courts. In 1967, the National Commission on Civil Disorders
reported that the "apparatus of justice in some areas ha[d] itself
become a focus of distrust and hostility" as the result of" . . . a
belief pervasive among ghetto residents that the poor and unedu-
cated are denied equal justice in many of our lower courts. 12 5
The greater involvement of attorneys in defending against
misdemeanor prosecutions should also have a beneficial effect
upon law enforcement. The provisions of the Constitution and
the interpretations thereof by the courts are mere words on paper
without vigorous assertion of those provisions by capable criminal
defense attorneys. Higher professional standards by law enforce-
ment officers must include obedience to constitutional limitations
governing police powers. Zealous enforcement of constitutional
rights by criminal defense attorneys serves as a powerful reminder
to the police of their constitutional obligations. Effective repre-
sentation by counsel in misdemeanor cases can serve to focus
judicial attention upon, and thereby, hopefully reduce, im-
proper police procedures which have heretofore gone undetected. 126
Previous absence of counsel in such cases undoubtedly resulted
in considerable laxity by the police in this regard, subjecting un-
told numbers of innocent persons to improper police practices.
Hopefully, effective implementation of Argersinger will mini-
mize such practices and also result in higher standards of law
enforcement.
Finally, the economic pressures resulting from the financial
burden of supplying counsel will, perhaps, induce a greater effort
to resort to alternatives to prosecution, such as the diversion of
offenders into rehabilitative programs. Initial indications are
that such programs can substantially reduce recidivism. This is
a welcome change from the dismal experience of the punishment-
deterrent approach. By spurring the drive toward rehabil-
itative alternatives, the Argersinger decision may well produce
its most meaningful and long-lasting benefit to the criminal jus-
tice system.
125. REPORT OF THE NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N ON CIVIL DISORDERS 337
(1968).
126. See Hellerstein, The Importance of the Misdemeanor Case on Trial and
Appeal, 28 LEGAL AID BRIEFCASE 151-52 (1970), wherein the author reports:
Police perjury is also most blatant in misdemeanor cases. Numer-
ous arrests are made on the basis of insufficient cause. Once again, the
psychological factor that the case is not a felony is at work, and the
arresting officer will subscribe to the additional rationalization that
even if the defendant did nothing wrong in this case, he is known as a
bad fellow and things just even out.
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